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Intellectual Property For Latin America:
How Soon Will It Work?
RobertM Sherwood*
Throughout the world, in every country, there are highly intelligent individuals with the
capacity to create valuable inventions. Whether this potential is encouraged or suppressed,
and whether their country benefits as a result, is greatly influenced by the intellectual proper-
ty system of the country.
This paper has a hero, perhaps a tragic hero. He is an inventor, and a citizen of a Latin
American country. It could be any country. For convenience we will call him Herocio. He
could, just as easily, be a she. In fact, there are many Herodos and Herocias.
Herocio's predicament is common to many in Latin America. He has an inventive
mind, approaching world-class competence. His creativity has inspired him throughout his
life. He keeps thinking of new ways to do things, improve things, and solve technical prob-
lems. He has tried on occasion to actualize his ideas, but has found little or no support for
them. In fact, he has pretty much given up trying.
A talented engineer in Guayaquil owns a large company that makes industrial equip-
ment. Every Herocio knows his story. Occasionally he makes improvements in his
machines. The improvements are quickly copied by his competitors. During a visit, the
author once asked him if he ever thought of getting a patent. No, he replied, because he
believes they are worth very little. Suppose the system got better, so they became worth
something. Would this change the way you do business? Oh, yes, he said. Then, he would
devote his time and his company's resources to making improvements in his machines.
Two comparable engineers own companies in the industrial city of Cuenca. One makes
textiles and the other ceramics. Both have made inventions, but the inventions resulted from
accidents or because problems arose that had to be solved. Neither man devotes regular
efforts to improving the products he makes. Both have said that if they believed that patents
were useful, they would eagerly spend time trying to improve their products.
Herocio went to some of the usual financing sources to seek funds for the development
of his inventions, but he was turned down because he didn't have enough assets for collateral.
The government's agency for technology promotion also turned him down, saying his edu-
cation was not good enough, and besides, his inventions were not in the fields of technology
favored by the government's current industrial policy.
Robert M. Sherwood is an author and consultant specializing in the implications of intellectual
property for developing countries.
Paper prepared for Second Conference on "The Economic and Political Challenges of Market
Reforms in Latin America", Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 4 October 1997.
Copyright retained, 1997.
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For those who know Latin America, Herocio's story is not a surprise. It is distressingly
familiar. At least three explanations for his distress are commonly offered by observers, each
of them wrong.
The first explanation for Herocio's tragic fate is that Latin America's countries are poor
and cannot, indeed, should not, be expected to provide financial support for inventors. The
second explanation declares that everyone knows that valuable technology comes only from
the developed countries. One should not expect the developing countries to produce valu-
able technology. This explanation assumes that good brains are distributed to only certain
segments of the world's population. A third explanation asserts that intellectual property
protection is a tool of neo-colonialism and should be resisted in order to free poor nations
from dependency on the strong countries of the North. This view has been losing vitality,
but lingers in many minds. It assumes that intellectual property protection cannot play a
role in stimulating private activity in developing countries.
I. A Glance at History.
A brief glance at where intellectual property came from may help us reflect on the situa-
tion in Latin America. Fascinating literature is available. 1 In the Middle East in ancient
times, communities valued water and the water pots made by skilled potters. It was the prac-
tice of the potters to trace an identifying mark in their works to distinguish them from the
works of others. Those early communities decided to honor those marks so that people
could rely on those marks when seeking pots of a particular quality and source. In Europe,
from the Middle Ages through the Nineteenth Century, the craft guilds developed secret
techniques for producing various goods. Through the apprenticeship system, they trained
successive generations in those skills, maintaining what were highly valuable trade secrets.
Often company owners did not know the secrets of the guild craftsmen.
New technology constantly spawns protection for its intellectual content. The rights of
authors (copyright) developed in the wake of the invention of the printing press. The con-
cept of the patent emerged haltingly in the early modem period from the heightened creativ-
ity of the northern Italian states as trade with the Orient flourished.
A thread runs through these historical developments. Communities have long realized
that by offering special treatment for inventive people, more inventions were produced
which benefited the community as a whole. Robert Solow and Edwin Mansfield have pio-
neered in identifying the considerable economic power derived from the introduction of
new technology into the American economy early in this century. Solow's work showed that
for the period 1909 to 1949, dose to half of the U.S. economy's growth was attributable to
what was initially termed a residual, a factor largely identified as the infusion of new technol-
ogy into the life of the nation.2 Mansfield has since suggested that to increase growth in
social welfare, greater protection for intellectual property should be considered. 3
1. For example, as a point of entry, see Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545
to 1787,261. PAT. [& Trademark] Off. Soc'y 711-60 (1944).
2. See Robert Solow, Technical Change and Aggregate Production Function, 39 Rev. EcON. & STAT.
312,314 (1957).
3. Edwin Mansfield et al. Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q. J.
ECON. 221 (May 1977).
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At a theoretical level, it is quite inviting to posit that the introduction of new technology
into most of the countries of Latin America would have a comparable, and perhaps even
greater, effect on their economic growth. However, we have yet to witness such an infusion
of technology derived from national sources of inventiveness, and the introduction of many
kinds of technology from abroad has been restrained.
In short, a glance at history suggests that communities and countries that have seen the
value of encouraging local people to create and invent have provided the means to encourage
and support their activities through some kind of protection for the results of their intellec-
tual efforts. Today, we know this as intellectual property.
II. Stimulating Intellectual Effort.
One obvious difference between the developed countries of the Northern and the Latin
American countries in this century has been the quality of protection for intellectual proper-
ty. Most Latin American countries have intellectual property systems imported from Europe
during the second half of the 19th century. A fairly high regard for literary pursuits has typi-
cally offered protection for the rights of authors (copyright), at least in concept, if not always
in practice. In general, however, that European inheritance suffered neglect. Since the
Second World War, many of these systems have been subjected to deliberate weakening.
In the last decade, several factors have combined to produce a flurry of reforms
throughout Latin America and in many other countries. Beginning in late 1984, the United
States began to pressure countries, using the threat of trade retaliation under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of that year. By this means, the U.S. Trade Representative demanded adequate
and effective protection for intellectual property. The results have been mixed but did
prompt changes in a few countries and focussed minds in others.
The growing desire for enhanced trade has been expressed in both global and regional
agreements concluded since 1990, many of which contain intellectual property arrange-
ments. The TRIPS Agreement, discussed below, is paramount among them, but the NAFTA
accord involving Canada, Mexico, and the United States, the decisions of the Andean coun-
tries under ANCOM, and the provisions of the Group of Three each contain explicit intellec-
tual property arrangements. 4 In negotiating bilateral trade agreements in recent years,
Mexico has insisted that intellectual property provisions be included.
Beyond these trade-centered factors, awareness of intellectual property has been
growing in many countries. The high velocity of scientific advances, the globalization of
television news, and the expanding use of the Internet, among other things, are heighten-
ing this awareness.
Notwithstanding the influence of these factors, considerable suspicion of intellectual
property pervades most of Latin America today. Latin Americans were taught by Raul
Prebisch and those of his school that intellectual property is a tool by which the countries of
the center dominate the countries of the periphery. Many have found the poetry of the
Prebisch analysis compelling. Moreover, because the United States demands strong protec-
4. Curiously, the MERCOSUR trade accord did not attempt to deal with intellectual property pro-
tection and subsequent efforts to build a common regime for trademarks alone have encountered
difficulties.
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tion for intellectual property, it is suspect. Beyond this, in recent generations, strong and
effective protection has not been available in Latin American countries so it has not been
tried. That is to say, inventors have not known the encouragement of such protection, nor
have private investors known its stimulating effect.
Against this background, it may be timely to ask what level of intellectual property pro-
tection will be sufficient to fully stimulate intellectual efforts and when will that level be
available in Latin America. This paper's intention is to answer those questions.
III. Stimulating the Local Inventor.
The TRIPS Agreement is now regarded as the benchmark for intellectual property pro-
tection. Because it is embodied in a widely-accepted international agreement, there is a ten-
dency to uncritically assume its level of protection is adequate for all purposes.
The TRIPS Agreement emerged from the Uruguay Round of GATT multinational trade
negotiations. The agreement, formally tiled the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, is part of the package of agreements associated with the forma-
tion of the World Trade Organization, now the world's regime for trade facilitation.
The inclusion of intellectual property in the Uruguay Round agenda was hotly contest-
ed. Although limited discussion of counterfeiting had begun during the previous Tokyo
Round of GATT negotiations, the topic was cast aside at the end of that round without
reaching any decisions. At the 1986 inaugural sessions of the Uruguay Round, the United
States strenuously urged inclusion of intellectual property. India, Brazil, and a dozen other
developing countries strenuously urged exclusion. The topic was admitted, but as an
appendage. As the round began, this agenda item was restricted to those aspects of intellec-
tual property that relate to trade. A furious debate ensued over what might constitute trade-
related intellectual property.
As the negotiations progressed, this debate subsided but remained a defining back-
ground influence. The negotiators struggled for over six years to forge a text. India and
Brazil opposed many of the U.S. demands. The European countries weighed in on both
sides of many issues. In the end, the TRIPS text was not forged by the negotiators but was
offered to them by the staff of the GATT secretariat hours before the December 1991 dead-
line for completing the Round. It was characterized by some as a balanced text because it
presented an amalgamation of the two main competing texts as the deadline neared.
The historic role of intellectual property protection has been to stimulate creativity and
invention, not to facilitate trade. From the nature of its origins, the TRIPS Agreement
aspired only to the latter. As a compromise between countries that favored and opposed
strong protection, it cannot be held up as a model for the stimulation of creativity and inven-
tion. The negotiators were given a mandate to reduce trade friction and encourage trade
flows, and they responded to that mandate. They gave little, if any, consideration to the his-
toric role of intellectual property, which is essentially to encourage investment in high levels
of technology.
This observation does not answer the question of what higher level of protection is suf-
ficient to stimulate private investment in support of technology development. The United
States, Japan, most of the European countries, and a few others have attained such a level
without having identical intellectual property systems. Yet, their systems are complex and
perhaps too unwieldy for most developing countries.
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A search for this sufficient level of protection has proceeded along the following lines.
Starting in 1992, the InterAmerican Development Bank, in furthering its Investment Sector
Program, a program designed to foster a policy environment conducive to private invest-
ment, began to evaluate the intellectual property systems in selected countries.5 This work
proceeded quietly and without reference to the negotiations that lead in late 1993 to the
TRIPS Agreement.
Analyses of the intellectual property systems of a dozen countries were prepared over
the next four years. Because uniformity in conducting these analyses was an implicit value, a
numerical template was created for assessing and comparing national systems. The numeri-
cal ratings derived from this system proved useful in responding to the inevitable questions
about which country had the best system. Subsequent work in other countries for the World
Bank and others has permitted assessments of eighteen developing countries which have
been included in the numerical rating system.6
The numerical rating system adopted a base scale of 100 points. Eight components of
an intellectual property system were evaluated. Within each component, standard questions
were asked of those in each country who were in the best position to answer them. This
involved extensive interviews with local intellectual property lawyers, business people, and







Trade Secret protection 15
Higher Life Forms 6
Treaties 6
Total 100
The news in this template may be the large number of points assigned to trade secret
protection, nearly as many as for patent protection. The Higher Life Forms category was cre-
ated to highlight the importance of intellectual property protection for the agriculture sector.
It includes both the UPOV-style of protection for new plant varieties and the patentability of
transgenic plants and animals above the level of the microorganism.
The application of the numerical template is meant to reveal those gaps and deficiencies
in national intellectual property systems which will tend to discourage private investors. The
template reflects the perspective of the average investor, and, in particular, the average local
investor. Therefore, the template may under- or over-represent the views of any specific
industry or even a specific company. Nonetheless, the numerical rating system has been
offered to assist in analyzing the role of intellectual property in economic development.
5. The author was active in this program as a consultant.
6. For a full description of the methodology and application of this numerical rating system, see
Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of
Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 2, 261-370 (1997) A Spanish translation has
been published by Editora Heliasta in Buenos Aires.
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The findings obtained from the application of the numerical system to date are
derived from Sherwood 1997 and presented in Tables I and 2 at the end of this paper.
Table 1 shows the results of the application of the template to each of the eighteen coun-
tries. The numbers shown indicate the points subtracted under each of the eight compo-
nents. The subtracted points reflect conditions which discourage private investors. A high
score means a negative assessment.
The total of these negative points for each country is then subtracted from the base of
100. One to three bonus points can then be added to reflect general public commitment to
intellectual property protection. The resulting scores are then shown in Table 2, which indi-
cates the position of each of the eighteen countries relative to the others. The United States,
Japan, and the leading European countries are shown in their probable relative position in
Table 2, but the numerical template has not been applied to their intellectual property sys-
tems. No country attains or even approaches the theoretically perfect score of 100 because





Enfcmt Admin Copyrt Patent Tdrark Td Scts Liffms Trties
of possible (25) (10) (12) (17) (91 (15) (6) (6) =100
ARGENTINA 21 3 4 13 0
BAHAMAS 0 1 4 3 3
BARBADOS 0 9 7 10 1
BRAZIL 13 8 4 10 1
CHILE 9 5 2 5 1
COSTA RICA 9 0 0 16 3
ECUADOR 20 7 5 9 3
EL SALVADOR 21 8 5 1 7
GUATEMALA 25 8 10 14 7
INDIA 12 3 5 11 4
MEXICO 19 2 7 1 0
NICARAGUA 19 5 10 13 7
PAKISTAN 9 6 8 14 5
PANAMA 17 5 3 7 A
PARAGUAY 21 5 10 15 7
PERU 14 1 3* 9* 1*
SOUTH KOREA 7 2* 3 6*. 1
URUGUAY 7 2 8 14 5
TRIPS 18 3 4 10 0













7 3 4 = 58
10 3 2 = 57
12 6 5 = 87
8 6 5 = 54
3 1 0 =33
13 6 4 =77
1 2 6 =51
12 6 6 =64
12 6 2 =78
7 3'* 2 =40
5* 2 2 =28
10 4 2 =52
3 4 4 =46
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100
(75-90+ = US, EU, Japan)
83 Bahamas
74 South Korea























Caution: the scale increments are not evenly distributed and the position of the Mansfield categories
relative to the scale calibration is.done by inference and is approximate.
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While it may be interesting to note the relative positions of the eighteen rated countries,
it is important to press further to ascertain the meaning of those positions. Again, the ques-
tion asks for indications of the level of protection at which investment stimulus is achieved.
Two empirical guides point to an answer. The first is derived from the author's observa-
tions made during the many weeks spent in the various countries reported in the numerical
rating system study. The second guide is a correlation of those observations with the find-
ings of a study conducted by Edwin Mansfield for the International Finance Corporation of
the World Bank Group.7 This correlation is presented in Table 2.
The Mansfield studies reflect the views of large American, German, and Japanese firms
selected from six industries relative to the intellectual property systems in fourteen develop-
ing countries. The firms were asked about their willingness to invest in, joint venture, and
license their best and latest technology in those countries. The questions went further to
examine the firms' willingness in relation to sales and distribution, assembly, component
manufacture, complete manufacturing, and research and development.
By comparing the results of the numerical rating system with the Mansfield findings, it
is possible to suggest that the industrial base of countries with scores below 50 will tend to be
characterized by sales and distribution, assembly and component manufacture. Countries at
the middle of the scale, where the TRIPS Agreement was placed, will tend to experience
greater trade flows and investment which supports trade-related activities. Only those coun-
tries which appear further up on the scale are likely to experience complete manufacture of
more sophisticated products and research and development. The threshold for the top level
is not dearly defined but probably somewhere in the vicinity of a seventy.
Several observations emerge from this correlation. The type of investment attracted
to the three lowest levels of industrial activity - sales, components, and assembly - is capa-
ble of arriving and withdrawing rather quickly. It is often a type of inventory financing.
At the higher activity levels of full manufacturing and R&D, investments tend to be more
durable since the facilities have a low salvage value. At the three lower activity levels,
employee training is minimal. At the higher levels, human resource development is not
only possible, but it becomes imperative.
In a study commissioned by the World Intellectual Property Organization, nine activi-
ties commonly influenced by intellectual property protection were analyzed in relation to the
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement: innovation, price levels, technology acquisition,
human skills development, private investment in technology, science for agriculture, private
risk capital, and university technology transfer.8 This analysis posited three levels of intellec-
tual property protection: non-robust, trade-facilitating, and robust or investment-stimulat-
ing. In thinking through the ramifications of these three levels for the nine activity areas, it
became clearer that the TRIPS level of protection does not attain a level that would most
fully benefit developing countries.
7. See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer, and Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment, and Technology
Transfer: Germany, Japan and the United States, International Finance Corporation, Discussion
Paper No 19, 1994, and Discussion Paper No 27, 1995, respectively.
8. Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement. Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 3,
491-544 (1997).
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Reverting to Herocio, the hero of this paper, we want to ask for his views about the level
of protection needed to encourage his inventiveness. He probably doesn't know much about
intellectual property, but let us suppose that his older brother studied biotechnology for two
years at an advanced degree level in England and then returned home. He told Herocio
about the dose working relationship he found there between local companies in his field and
his professors. By osmosis, his brother gained the impression that somehow the British intel-
lectual property system gives private companies an incentive to follow what is going on in
particular fields at the British universities, to offer grants and fellowships, to hire the recent
graduates for serious internal research programs, and to license university inventions from
time to time. The brothers find nothing comparable in their country.
Herocio and his brother have noticed that companies that operate in many countries
have options for conducting research. For example, they read that during a period when
biotechnology research results were not well protected in Europe, many European companies
established laboratories in the United States. They know from their own experience, either
in seeking jobs doing serious research in local companies (there are almost none) or in
attempting to launch micro-companies based on new technology (for which private risk
capital is unavailable), that local inventors and local companies have only one option when
attempting to create or advance some new technology. They must do it locally since they do
not have the means to set up research facilities elsewhere.
The experience of the industrialists in Ecuador is very telling, and they are not unique to
Latin America or to many developing countries. They say they would be willing to invest
time and resources to improve their products if they felt that the means to protect their
inventions were available. Herocio's life would be different too. He would know that if he
came up with better technology, he would have a chance to attract private risk capital to sup-
port his work. He would feel more confident in building small teams of scientists to help
him develop his inventions, rather than try to do it all himself to avoid loss of his secrets.
In short, the ability of developing countries to greatly enhance their own industrial and
agricultural sectors will depend to an important degree on the ability of the intellectual
property system to encourage research and development by local inventors. From a slightly
different perspective, one of any developing country's most valuable resources is its creative
and inventive people. They are a seriously underutilized resource until the intellectual prop-
erty system attains a level of stimulation that appears to be somewhat above the protective
level that the TRIPS Agreement stipulates.
There are at least three tests by which to judge whether a nation's intellectual property
system has attained that level. One is to consider whether tiny companies that have intangi-
ble technology as their only asset are able to attract private risk capital. Another is to observe
whether the results of university research are sought by local companies, thereby finding use-
ful application within the national economy. A third test is to note whether large and mid-
sized local companies devote time and resources to a sustained program of research designed
to improve products, quality, and process technology. The willingness of companies to
transfer technology to third parties might provide another test.
One night, Herocio and his brother were reflecting on the losses sustained by their
country because of the lack of an adequate intellectual property system. Together, they knew
of several dozen inventions, which they and colleagues and friends of theirs had made, which
never attracted financial support and which never achieved commercial application. They
speculated that within the local companies and universities many technical improvements
had probably been made which no one ever thought of as patentable inventions. They were
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dear that not all inventions deserve backing and that the failure rate for new technology is
high. Still, they concluded that their country has probably suffered a considerable loss and
late that night they pondered how that loss might be measured. They concluded that count-
ing things that do not happen is either very easy or very hard. They agreed that they should
ask some economists about this.
They have since often thought of themselves as potential national heroes, like Alexander
Graham Bell or Thomas Edison in the United States and Canada. For now, they decided
they can only be tragic heroes.
IV. A Touch of Political Economy.
Table 2 provides a slender springboard for a brief consideration of the political economy
of intellectual property enhancement in developing countries. It is common in developing
countries for those commercial interests that benefit from non-robust levels of intellectual
property protection to be well-organized, articulate, and sometimes aggressive in opposition
to higher levels of protection. One of the classic examples of this is the national pharmaceu-
tical industry association in Argentina. On the other hand, since robust protectibn is not
available, no local interests that would benefit from such protection have sprung up to
espouse those levels. Thus, few voices speak out in support of higher levels of protection.
Those who have traveled, studied, or worked abroad will sometimes have an appreciation of
the potential benefits of enhanced protection for their country. Herocio, his brother, and a
few of their friends are aware of the difficulties caused by the lack of such protection, but
they are neither organized nor articulate. They represent a kind of latent demand for better
protection, but these individuals perceive themselves as solitary or isolated individuals with
no ability to move the national consensus. In fact, their stories are often quite moving.
V. How Soon?
Upon examining the numerical rating template as applied to her country, a senior offi-
cial asked how long it would take to attain the level at which investment stimulation was like-
ly to occur. She considered the point score under each of the eight categories and realized
that most of the gaps and deficiencies could be rectified fairly quickly through legislative
enactment or administrative reforms.
Fortunately, in her case, the judicial system functions fairly effectively so that the only
improvements needed were largely a matter of refinements in the civil and criminal proce-
dure codes. Unfortunately, strong negative public sentiments regarding certain aspects of
intellectual property were widespread in the national mindset. We speculated about how
long it would take to reverse those sentiments.
The recent experience of Mexico is instructive and could be studied further. In 1987, the
government passed legislation which, although not a great advance, moved in the direction of
more effective protection. Curiously, one of the major government research laboratories soon
reported a positive impact on its activities as a result The laboratory managers informed the
SECOFI ministry officials responsible for intellectual property of that impact. Then, in 1991,
another statutory reform moved the system further up the rating scale. Again, certain
Mexican individuals and companies reported benefits that accrued to them as a result. A
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broader public consensus in favor of strong protection began to grow. In 1994, fine-tuning of
the intellectual property system was accomplished as still more Mexicans learned of the bene-
fits for their interests. Today, as noted above, Mexico demands stronger protection for intel-
lectual property from its trading partners when negotiating bilateral accords.
It is reported that, among other indications of improved protection, the Federal pros-
ecutor's office in Mexico has begun to vigorously pursue trade secret violations. This is
important since there is virtually no basis for private civil actions against the loss of trade
secrets in Mexico.
Notwithstanding this growing awareness of benefits, the number of patent applications
filed by Mexican residents in recent years has not increased, although applications from for-
eigners have been rising substantially. This is somewhat difficult to understand except from
an appreciation for the weakness of the Mexican judicial system. Since residents are closest
to the situation, they may be particularly aware of this weakness.
Thus, two main issues become the focus of this brief consideration of how long it will be
before intellectual property protection begins to play a significant role in the production of
new technology and creative expression in the countries of Latin America. The first concerns
public sentiment The other must examine the ability of judicial systems to sustain intellec-
tual property rights.
A. PUBLIC SENTIMENT.
Countless laws have been passed throughout Latin America, which have never taken
root in public administration, judicial action, or public awareness. Given the history of neg-
ative public sentiment regarding intellectual property, it is not an overstatement to suggest
that only as public demand for robust intellectual property protection is expressed will intel-
lectual property systems work in Latin America. Intellectual property systems involve large
doses of administrative discretion and judicial discernment If public administrators who
operate the patent and trademark registries are unconvinced and if judges are ill-informed or
antagonistic, the system will not work well.
In the nature of the situation, we can anticipate that public sentiment will eventually
swing to a more positive appreciation of intellectual property. The negative views of intellec-
tual property, which flourished in many countries from about 1950 to nearly 1990, were
asserted by people who have now fallen into discredit for various reasons or have died.
During that period, their voices filled the region's vacuum of public ignorance about intellec-
tual property.
The major portions of the TRIPS Agreement's requirements are scheduled to take effect
in developing countries at the turn of the century. While its provisions tend to facilitate
trade rather than encourage investment in research, many people will feel the impact and
shift to a more favorable attitude. We can predict that by about 2005, public sentiment will
be appreciably altered.
Of course, this shift can be accelerated by increased education. Unfortunately, most
educational efforts thus far have simply described intellectual property without going further
to explain its benefits for economic growth and development. Case studies of the experience
of inventive local people who have been frustrated by a lack of adequate protection could
deepen the public's understanding. Economic analysis of the nation's losses sustained by rea-
son of inadequate protection would help to further educate the policy community.
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Articulate Latin Americans can also assist in shifting public sentiment Many useful
things can be said. A few such individuals have already begun to speak. More will no
doubt emerge in the next few years. Some politicians, prominent among them the current
president of Brazil, have spoken dearly about the desirability of robust protection for
national benefit.
B. JUDICIAL SUPPORT.
Invariably, one of the weakest components in the intellectual property regimes of Latin
America is the judicial system. Of the thirteen Latin American countries assessed in the
numerical rating system, judicial enforcement for ten of them was rated at negative thirteen
or worse. Many of the other developing countries that have not yet been assessed under the
numerical rating system will be found in a comparable condition.
The numerical rating system inquired about judicial independence, patterns of corrup-
tion, the competence and formation of judges, judicial knowledge of intellectual property
concepts, and judicial authority to apply immediate precautionary measures. When a judi-
cial system is found wanting in regard to any of these categories, it is probably safe to assume
that corrections will not be swiftly available.
Some observers will perhaps note that the TRIPS Agreement contains provisions that
describe extensive requirements for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Since
these provisions come into force for developing countries as of January 1, 2000, might we not
expect an acceleration of judicial system corrections where they are called for by the TRIPS
Agreement?
While there will surely be some effect, Article 41(5) of the TRIPS Agreement makes
explicit that countries need not apply extra resources to intellectual property enforcement
and need not create special enforcement arrangements for intellectual property. In other
words, the condition of a judicial system as of January 1, 2000, will define the country's
obligations in this regard under the TRIPS Agreement. Unfortunately, as noted, many devel-
oping countries have judicial systems that are for the most part unable to provide effective
support for intellectual property rights and many other rights for that matter.
Viewed from this perspective, Article 41(5) is not an escape clause. It simply recognizes
the actual situation that exists in many countries. So, once again we must address the ques-
tion of how long it will be before intellectual property will work for Latin American coun-
tries. To paraphrase a saying, a right without a remedy is but an expensive illusion. The
expense of obtaining a patent or a trademark when effective enforcement will be unavailable
is surely a waste of resources. Two different paths can be followed in answering this question.
One path examines for a complete cure; the other looks at partial remedies.9
Rather than urge judicial system reform for the sake of intellectual property rights, or
indeed for the sake of moral or ethical concepts, it may be more promising to urge judicial
reform on the grounds that in an open economy, the lack of a well-functioning judicial sys-
tem costs the national economy dearly. This pocketbook approach argues that every pocket
will benefit from judicial reform. Conversely, every pocketbook will suffer without it The
9. Alternative dispute resolution using conciliation or arbitration is not among the cures or reme-
dies. While probably useful for other types of disputes, an infringer is not likely to be willing to
submit to ADR techniques, if indeed he can be located after the infringement.
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extent of the suffering remains largely unquantified, but it could be substantial. 10 This
approach could provide an accelerated path to comprehensive judicial reform. Even if accel-
erated, the needed corrections will not come quickly. Perhaps the swiftest teacher will be the
experience of countries with judicial systems that function relatively well with respect to
intellectual property, such as that of Chile.
The path of partial remedies can be pursued more quickly than the option of the com-
plete cure. The final result, however, will be less satisfactory.
The path of partial remedies contains three components: training for judges, specialized
courts, and sharpened tools for enforcement. Training for judges is an art form that is largely
undeveloped in most of Latin America. Training is offered and the offers are sometimes
accepted, but the approach is usually unimaginative. Lecturers tend to read new statutes to
judges who are fully capable of reading the statutes themselves. Some exposure to the events
of the real world, which a new statute is intended to address, would be more fruitful.
Training for judges in Brazil has recently demonstrated the value of exposure to economic
concepts. This is helping to make explicit the intuitions on which judges rely as they make
their decisions.
Specialized intellectual property courts, if well designed and constituted, could help
to significantly upgrade intellectual property systems in Latin America. Peru, Chile, and
Panama have these courts already and Mexico has them under informal consideration.
Brazil's new patent law speaks of their creation, although under the 1988 constitution,
the decision rests with the judicial power. Germany, England, the Dutch, and the United
States have specialized courts of various kinds that deserve careful evaluation by devel-
oping countries.
Sharper tools for enforcement would include such things as a range of precautionary
measures by which violations of intellectual property rights could be promptly halted. Some
countries have procedural codes that authorize such measures, yet judges in some of these
countries are commonly reluctant to apply these tools.
More could be said about each of these partial remedies. The most important thing to
note, however; is that each is partial. Even taken together, they remain partial. In other
words, if the judicial system in general suffers from severe problems, these partial remedies
will ultimately be vulnerable to failure.
10. See Robert Sherwood et al., Judicial Systems and Economic Performance, 34 Q. REV. EcON. & FIN.,
Summer 1994, at 101.
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VI. Conclusion.
How soon? How long before intellectual property works for Latin America? It will
probably happen faster than many expect. Already, those who visit Latin America frequently
can feel the change in public sentiment. In Brazil, for example, the new patent law took
effect in May, 1997, and within a few months the fire went out of public debate on the issue.
There is an unspoken acceptance of the change and a willingness to see what will happen.
Latin Americans are intelligent and quick to learn what is happening in other parts of
the world. Many younger people in particular are in touch with trends outside their country.
Intellectual property is something being discussed by serious young people in many coun-
tries today.
Judicial system reform will be a much longer process. Progress in this regard is vital, not
only for intellectual property to flourish but to encourage and sustain many other elements
of economic development. A judicial system that functions well is a necessary foundation
for all the institutions that matter. As this is more widely recognized, particularly among
judges themselves, perhaps judicial reform will accelerate and flourish. Beyond this, installa-
tion of the three mentioned partial remedies will help to build an appetite for even stronger
enforcement and accelerate its arrival.
